© UNIVERSAL RESEARCH REPORTS
ISSN: 2348 - 5612
https://urr.shodhsagar.com

SHODH SAGAR
International Publications

Original Article	Refereed & Peer Reviewed	Vol. 10, Issue: 02	Apr – Jun 2023

Transformations in Rural India: Exploring New Avenues of Power and Political Entrepreneurship[1]

Vikas Sharma
Senior Research Fellow
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
yesvikas4@gmail.com

How to Cite:
Vikas Sharma. (2023). Transformations in Rural India: Exploring New Avenues of Power and Political Entrepreneurship. *Universal Research Reports*, *10*(2), 215-223.

Abstract:
Beyond traditional but important caste and class perspectives, this sociological investigation of rural India poses important questions regarding changing power systems. Examining current patterns, the study answers the following important questions: Can the historically urban-based rural economy homogenise or diversify the rural elites' makeup? Do possibilities promoted by the state and technological progress guarantee a fair distribution of wealth? Is it possible for rural society to break through the barriers of caste and class and create new elite groups? The research explores issues including political entrepreneurship, agricultural breakthroughs, and migration, offering insights into the complex changes that cast doubt on the cultural importance of villages in capitalist countries. In order to comprehend power dynamics and societal transformation, this research provides a thorough analysis of the changing rural landscape, revealing layers of complexity.

Keywords: Rural Power, Political Elites, Rural India

Introduction

It is hard to discuss the village in rural India without taking caste into account from a sociological perspective. Also, it will be impossible to examine texts on power structures, in particular, without considering the part caste plays in the distribution and maintenance of power. Nevertheless, no civilization is set up in a way that would result in a homogenised population divided only between caste and class. People can be organised in a variety of ways in each given culture. There are ways to arrange individuals into other power relations that bypass the limitations of caste or class. This paper identifies the current tendencies of new locations for the generation and the use of rural elites' power. The curiosity to look deeper into these new avenues of power generation comes from the changing nature of villages where rigidly stratified societies have been transforming into varied dynamic settlements that need not necessarily depend upon caste or class hierarchy solely to organise itself. The economy of such transforming sites such as villages is a multifaceted structure that comprises workers, labourers, owners, managers who don't necessarily share a relationship as was found in the case of jajmani, zamindari systems. These transformed relations are more likely to be organised on a need-base, where the economic-flow would decide who would work and who would not rather than purity-pollution dynamics where the polluted were only required to

[1] This paper is an updated version of the author's previous research work. I acknowledge Dr. Ashwani Kumar for his important comments on the earlier draft.

do menial jobs (Dumont 1970). Also, this nowhere means that this purity-pollution or caste based economic setups have completely vanished. They still are operative to great pockets of our country, but here the emphasis is on the site of power generation that lies outside of caste but still has failed to challenge and uproot caste based inequalities. Therefore, the important questions dealt with in this paper revolve around the following: Does the ideal construct of rural economy with its perennial linkages with the urban areas help rural elites to diversify or homogenise their composition? Do state sponsored or technological driven opportunities that generate wealth and equality are equitably distributed? Can rural society move beyond the dichotomies of caste or class in developing new rural elites? This paper will also analyse critically at the loss of the cultural importance of villages in capitalist society in the sense of dynamic and unique characteristics of Indian rural society. After the post-1990s liberalisation reforms, with increasing communication, transportation, and fall of employment, there has been a trend of active rural-urban and rural-rural migration (Datta 2016). The various development schemes which were implemented in rural India can be attributed to the functioning of three factors: behaviour, structure, and process. The development programmes focused much on structural aspects, and less attention was given to the behavioural aspect of agencies involved in implementation. The behavioural aspect is important as it makes us understand categories of human agents involved in implementing development schemes. Behaviour has also been an important element in Paroetvian sense, as a leading minority capable of interacting with democracy called elites, provide a lead to masses to interact in different branches of collective activities (Rath, Jena and Sahoo 1993) Before understanding the generation of elites and thus power across new avenues, it is essential to see who are these new elites and what base do they have? Does the rural elite still depend upon the land to control and reproduce inequality, domination over others as seen in cases like the zamindari system? With increased blurring of the distinction between rural and urban, has the size of minorities being dominated by elites decreased or increased? Karl Manheim asserts that history is made neither by masses nor by ideas, even not by the working force but by the elite who from time to time asserts themselves (Manheim 1997, 119-130). Elites generally proliferate in this world because of the social process of rising in population, increase in occupational opportunities, the growth of bureaucracy and moral diversity emerging out of this (Keller 1963, 66-76). The work of households is important to understand the diversification as or ‘pluri-active’ nature of members of elites (Lindberg, 2005). With these dynamics of rural society in mind, we will look into different aspects of how village society is radically changing and generating new rural elites.

Shift toward Migration: Remittances and Rise in Status

A recent survey on the drop of agricultural employment in terms of total workers shows a change to 45.7 percent in 2012 from 5.2 per cent in 2015 (Rodgers et.al 2016). The movement of rural population out of agriculture is a greater movement of ‘decoupling’ agriculture from rural. Migration in India is a lively fact as it goes in symmetry with growth and development. Migration has altered the traditional structure of rural India due to shift in agrarian economy to market economy with remittances; semi feudal labour market attaching land, labour and credit has grown weak with labour mobility; increase in rural wage; shift in status of women with more participation in casual labour (Datta 2016) (Sharma and Rodgers 2015).

While analysing the migration trends it is also important to look into the social life of the village and associated history. The structural changes in villages which lead to out migration are varied as they can be studied in the form of agricultural productivity, landholdings etc. Rural elites have an important role as he in most cases hold a large portion of land in villages and any discouragement of investment in agriculture

affects others especially those involved in direct employment in agricultural activities. In a recent comparison of Madhubani and Nalanda districts in Bihar, Datta shows how caste hierarchy influences out-migration. In Madhubani the Brahmins who were landowners didn't invest much in agriculture and in Nalanda the dominant Kurmi invested in agriculture more. The result is the higher out-migration rates in Madhubani than Nalanda (Datta, 2015).

Migration rates have increased for agricultural labourers and landless, particularly for scheduled castes. The duration, destination and nature of work in migration is determined by the location of migrants in economic and social position in the villages. The pattern of migration is broad based and it is accessed by all castes and classes (Datta 2016, 87). The landlord and attached labour has declined sharply post-liberalisation period and there are visible shifts in upper caste and middle castes like Yadav, Kurmi, Koeri shifting from agriculture to non-agricultural jobs (Sharma and Rodgers 205, 46). Aspiration for moving out also comes from the fact that upward mobility and increase in income is much dependent on self-improvement and learning of skill in urban areas in comparison to villages (Mitra 2006, 2130).

Whereas out-migration from the rural area does not necessarily result in lack of job opportunities because non-farm employment is also increasing in rural areas but is not able to contain out-migration (Datta 2016, 85). In a longitudinal study of Bihar Amrita Datta shows the remittances in the village has helped to increase rural wage rate. Many households are out of poverty because of remittances. She denies the rise of inequality but shows the unequal structures exist where "upper caste and classes are better able to access non-agricultural work and enjoy the highest income gains from migration (Datta 2016, 92).

Recruitment of labour from outside the local area is mostly based on labour control, low wage rates and labour scarcity. For some areas like Punjab, the immigrant labour fulfils the scarcity problem or secure food productivity by rural elites in the competitive time of harvesting. While in Gujarat, Breman reports the migration of labour is encouraged to replace local labour to better control (Breman 1985). Migration eventually leads to mobility and segmentation which is entrenched in mercantile capitalism. The nature of migration in rural to urban is similar to rural-to-rural according to Berman because both replace local workers and the informal markets at both places linked together by horizontal circulation of migrants in search of jobs (Breman 1996). Shrinking opportunities in local labour markets also increases local wages because of labour shortages. Labour market, particularly agricultural, is getting feminised due to men migrating for nearby towns or states (Sharma and Rodgers 2015, 52-53). The movement of women is restricted more to local agricultural jobs because of norms and social restrictions (Sundari 2005).

Remittances are important for meeting primary needs like food clothing, health and education (Rodgers and Rodgers 2011,46). It is not as commonly accepted that it helps in always establishing business or enterprise in rural areas. The elite in most cases enjoys early start of any enterprise which communities, in general, aspire to have in rural areas. Instead of remittances, in some cases, it is local moneylenders, personal and family savings that matter more. The business start-up is not a permanent source of income to make a continuous benefit by accumulating capital over a period. Rural transformations are not always in sync with the idea of reducing inequality and creating a level playing field for all. To take on a nonfarm economy, it is not an encouraging future trend. The lack of economic dynamism, temporary nature of self-owned enterprises, failure of government policies to impact because of lack of infrastructural facilities, will create nothing but distress, poverty and inequality.

Market and Farming

From village to global community the economy has interlinkages where dimension of food underlines and expresses the structural elements and political actions of the political economy. The material interests and the control over scarce resources resurrects the question of who gets to eat, what entitlements or means of acquisition are involved. Focus has shifted from very local village grain piles under the jajmani system to a globally connected market of unprecedented demands (Herring 2015, 3-4). The post-harvest markets are very significant for farmers as they hold their economic sustenance and income levels deciding their activities both on and off farm (Krishnamurthy 2014, 59). The globalisation of food products has given rise to contract farming in which there is a predetermined contract between producers and firms who purchase the products. The "selectivity bias" shapes the choice of farmers in rural society. In most of the cases, large farmers are preferred on asset basis (Sharma 2016). Nevertheless, the exclusion of small farmers still cannot stop them from making a difference in the corporatized farm sector. Urban elite and its conspicuous consumption has increased demand for organic food. These demands have potential effects on rural societies. The desire for organic food is not only health oriented but also cultural where a bourgeoisie imaginary constructs a countryside idea to use words of Michael Bunce (Bunce 1994). The debate between genetically modified cropping for organic food was part of the United Kingdom in the early twentieth century. A strong economic and cultural pull is exerted in this by having tension, as Bell calls between 'the production of idyllic food and the idyllic production of food' (Bell 1194, 157). The size of land takes a different shape concerning yield as small contract farmers get more yield than large farmers or medium farmers. Nivedita Sharma in her study of contact farming in Punjab shows the farm income for small farmers is 39,317.43 in per acre, medium farmers are 36,960.07, and large contract farmers are marginally high with 42,990.70 (Sharma, 2016, 66). But the important point is organic farming becomes a competitive force of production and the large farmers get a better deal from agri-business companies. The dominance of large farms is reflected in their capacity of production. Agricultural markets in India vary regionally and have centred on different commodity systems like cotton and milk in Maharashtra and Gujarat, rice and wheat in West Bengal and Bihar and as like. In primary markets in India the exchanges are heavily inclined against the individual producers, particularly small and marginal farmers. In study of agricultural markets in India, Krishnamurthy shows the failure of the Agricultural Produce Marketing Act(APMC) in India. The act notifies physical market sites or mandis for the sale of agricultural commodities in local markets. However, they are used by commission agents or primary traders and intermediaries who purchase it from primary producers(farmers). Taking West Bengal where 95 per cent of farmers are small and marginal landholders, she asks why poverty has not reduced among farmers when productivity has increased? She argues the onus lies in the structure of agricultural markets, where unfavourable terms of exchange with the intermediaries. The agro-commercial elite like rice mill owners use the credit, urban linkages and rural banking systems to take the produce of farmers and then use the weak state policy to generate surplus (Krishnamurthy 2015, 59-64). States like Punjab and Haryana the informal credit has persisted despite the disappearance of small scale moneylenders after the Green Revolution. Unavailability of credit from state institutions easily, the small and marginal farmers are directed to commission agents or *arhatiyas* as they are called for informal credit. Dominance of commission agents has bearing on procurement costs by state. Patronage from political lobby and their status as creditors helps them to bargain with state in annual procurements and form a political clout of their own (Singh 2012). Indian economic history also considers environment-induced agricultural barriers because resources were expensive and unevenly distributed. Factors like mode of irrigation in dry and wet areas, dependence on monsoons, nature of fertilisers, and

qualitative differences in seeds are likely barriers which existed for stagnation of Indian agriculture. The political success of agriculture after independence is because of input subsidies and public investments (Roy 2007, 239-250). Other scholars take traditional values of Indian society as a significant barrier to Indian economic growth. Weber, for example, is first sociologist to unravel the lack of rationalisation which occident opined for not India (and China also) (Weber 1958,19-25). Weber found an answer in the complex interdependence among Hindus, which is an institution of caste. The irresistible social force of Hinduism belittles the diversity of South Asia through caste for Weber (Weber 1958, 18-20).

The political economy of food involves a complex set of regulations and interest groups. The coterie of small groups of farmers and politician's influences indicators like minimum sale price because "Higher sale price means secured market for farmers, large procurement for Food corporation of India and Higher tax revenues for politicians in the states. Guaranteed markets make farmers happy, and the happier the farmers the greater the chance for politicians to get re-elected" (Rashid et.al 2008, 70). So the vote bank politics becomes very clear in matter of politicians working for farmers. The economic construction of politics helps politicians to override the identity based politics but there is not a clear pattern to it as rural power in India is still limited. In surplus rich states like Punjab, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh the government support price for wheat and rice between 1996-97 and 2001-02, grew faster by about 24 and 10 percent than the wholesale prices. The farmer's created false incentives by allocating more land, for example, while the national average saw an increase of 4 percent for area under rice cultivation, Punjab and Haryana saw 21 and 27 percent respectively (Rashid et.al 2008, 70). Whereas in deficit states like Bihar, politicians help in diverting nearly 85 percent of food allocated for distribution under social safety net programmes in black market (Dev et.al 2004).

Political Entrepreneurship: Social Networks and Opportunities.

Political entrepreneurs are "those individuals who perform the same or similar functions in the political sphere as entrepreneurs perform in a free market economy" (McCaffrey and Salerno 2011, 553). The focus in theory of political entrepreneurship is more in economic function and less on personality because the political, entrepreneurial function may be shared by a group. Here we limit our interest to more on nature of political entrepreneurs and their functioning. Therefore, it can be argued that political entrepreneurs are those individual "who change direction and flow of politics" (Schneider and Teske 1992,737). Entrepreneurs in local politics are like high-level leaders, elected like panchayat leaders, leaders work for and come from established interest group. Furthermore, in a sociological sense they can be classified by positions held in official bodies like in elected bodies; reputational like caste leaders or religious leaders; and lastly the functional leaders who carry a diverse array of networks. Panchayat positions have been one of the vital instruments to influence the working of a village and amass wealth in rural India. Religion and caste based identity politics have been a surge in India, thanks to the politicians who willfully use primordial identities of people to forward their interests and consolidate their position. A whole set of caste-based alliances has been strategically constructed by political entrepreneurs who in different ways forward commercial and economic rewards to their caste fellows (Chandra 2000). The stranglehold of upper caste on local panchayats got weak with reservations of Dalits in local bodies election after 73rd amendment act of 1993, but the durability of caste has resulted in producing dummy leaders. The act provides governance to society and not the state, which is a reflection of the broad neo-liberal trend (Mathur 2013). Originally meant to de-bureaucratise, increase accountability by empowering people to choose government at a local level it has resulted in bolstering of dominance and corruption. The elite with the help of old social networks

compromising mainstream parties, bureaucrats and businessmen in towns has helped them to maintain the status quo. Scheduled castes/Scheduled tribes were thought of getting benefit from the reservation in seats which they received but with handicaps which reduce the effectiveness in their participation. The lack of muscle and money power against the big farmers or traditional elites SC/ST has a frail chance of developing necessary networks. In an ethnographic study of agrarian regions of Malwa in Punjab, Nicolas Martin has shown how meaningful power still resides in the hands of rural elites and the assertion of SCs is loud and pressing but limited in exercise. With the reservations, SCs has gained access to the position but not power accruing from that position. Though it is not generalizable as pan-Indian phenomena, Martin reports that in the case of Punjab

"[T]hey(SCs) tended to act as proxies and rubber stamps for Jat patrons….. SC sarpanches were or had been the attached farm servants of Jat farmers who actually held the reigns of power. As such they were easier to control, and ready at hand to sign documents necessary to run the panchayat…… several cases in which panchayats had been nominated through consensus (sahmati) in order to avoid wasteful expense on elections and to prevent the escalation of factional conflict. …….it was wealthy and politically connected farmers who had ultimately decided matters. Finally, just as SC sarpanches tended to wield limited political power, SC panchayat members (panches) also tended to act as rubber stamps for the decisions of Jat sarpanches. Nor did SCs have the chance to vote on key panchayat decisions during gram sabhas because few, if any, villages ever held them" (Martin 2015, 40).

Therefore, the rural elite has maintained their traditional hold on positional and reputational political positions through their wealth, state connected political networks and muscle power. Breman (1996) in work on Gujarat moots the same moot arguing that whenever the SCs hold power positions in local bodies it is very likely the concentration of power remains in the hands of the rural elite. Same is also true for female candidates who are mostly mascots for their husbands or male members of the family.

It is interesting to understand patterns of emergence of political entrepreneurs among Dalit community. In different regions of the country, the Dalit assertion has become a common phenomenon to aspire for power. Various grassroots mobilisation activities are held in almost every sphere of society from cultural programmes, educational awareness, active involvement in social media as well as print media. For example, Chamars of Punjab have successfully created a counter culture against the dominant Jats (Judge 2015). Caste conflicts, education and awareness of rights among backward castes and Dalits has helped them to show their presence. But there is a strong urban, and rural linkage as the rise of Bahujan Samaj Party(BSP) involved city based political entrepreneurs who mobilised people in rural areas to gain power positions. With changes in preceding two decades' non-caste based political entrepreneurship has also gained ground in villages. It is difficult to call them leaders but they are entrepreneurs who influence the village polity. They are not dependent on official political positions like of Panchayats but are more or less independent. Writing on this Anirudh Krishna has hailed them in language of villagers as *naye neta* (new leaders) or *naye karyakarta* (new social workers) and argues

"[T]he new political entrepreneurs have gained considerable influence within the past twenty years. More villagers by far consult the naye neta for diverse tasks involving party politics, market brokerage, and interaction with government officials than any other type of leader" (Krishna 2003, 1175).

Change in economy and polity of villages reflect the rise of new leaders. The rise of state activities in villages in the form of developmental policies and taking benefits from them requires awareness of the nitty gritty of schemes. Therefore, there is demand for people who are young and educated to give intermediary services to connect people with the state. It is also true that institutions and offices of decision making and

implementation of any policy lies outside villages in towns or tehsils, so liaison with the government officials and party organisers is in demand. The transactions in this new business are not demanded by local people only, but the government also requires such new leaders to disseminate its schemes to the local population.

The functional importance of new leaders is not only with villagers but also with political parties who search for votes in villages. The prior dependence of political parties on big landlords and caste leaders seems to wane in front of political entrepreneurs. Weak grassroots organisational base among most of the political parties demand new leaders who can manipulate at village level both literate and illiterate. Krishna arguments of the rise of new leaders in the villages of Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan have been corroborated by F.G Bailey who while studying Orissa in the first decade of post-independent period anticipated the change in the form of leadership as a village is introduced to external influences (Bailey 1960, 114-115). Political entrepreneurs are dynamic in influencing villages as well as same state time because the restricted conduits are losing due to the participation of people themselves in an aspiration of changing things in villages (Krishna 2003, 1176). The logic of political entrepreneurs defies the idea of caste as a determining factor in mediation between state and village and in the locality of the villages also. The rural power which exclusively depends on caste has a 'marginal' shift not completely from the power of caste groups. New leaders are not necessarily coming from upper castes because of their literacy or good economic positions. Instead, political entrepreneurs are more coming from SCs and OBCs backgrounds. Krishna reports that of 197 castebased leaders 3.5 per cent were educated on average, the new leaders were more than three times literate- 9.6 on average. The skills and performance of leaders from marginalised groups are better and effective from that of their counterparts in upper castes. A minimum level of education and personal qualities like humility and perseverance, hard work works in favour of the marginalised section because upper castes observe Krishna, "are accustomed to privilege and comfort find such lives difficult to lead" (Krishna 2003, 1188-1189).

Crisis of Values and Aspirations: Disenchantment within Rural

The paradox is generated in the rural structure where farming in monetary terms is profitable for big and middle range landholders, but farmers are considered as poor in political discourse. The value of farming is reduced to a level where no prospects of job outside farm economy is becoming a constraint for marriage (Tilche 2016, 23). Due to 'jobless growth,' the existing capital-like land is becoming a refuge for young people (Sbriccoli 2016, 14-15). This retreat comes in the midst of diversification and intensification of non-farm activities in rural areas. At the same time, there is debate on how to view the village as 'rural settlements' or an ideal construct of the village as space for community living. Such an understanding comes when the village is seen as declining in all its manifestations and stuck in the narrative of 'crises'. The rural power is also constrained in Indian democracy because the rural sector has legislative representation and not the executive, that is, within state institutions. Furthermore, the self-limitation of rural power exists as no rural party at national level exists because of cross cutting cleavages of caste, religion and ethnicity. The political field is divided into civil society having urban middle class and capitalist interests and political society having the rural population and urban poor. Rural population exists as a strong negotiator but is ill defined, and its demands are not contingent with the leadership of the capitalist class of politicians. Therefore, the village which was a nation incarnate in popular Indian perception has become now a proxy for tradition, slow and conservative and most importantly unchanging because of unending crises reflected in farmer suicides, caste violence and khap panchayats (Thakur 2017,49). But the rural society is flourishing

demographically and remains significant for the state in policy making and political engagements. Political entrepreneurship is giving new opportunities for new political engagements, remittances by migration and the non-farm economy has given improved status to people in villages, expanding agro-industry, and public demands are generating new opportunities for investment in the rural society. Therefore, rural-agrarian dominance is to be looked at through the empirical context and the question of rural elites is to be located in this fundamental transformation.

References:

Bailey, F.G. 1957. *Caste and the Economic Frontier*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Bell, Michael. 1994. Childerley: Nature and Morality in a Country Village. Morality and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Breman, Jan 1996. Footloose Labour: Working in India's Informal Sector. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bunce, M., 2005. The countryside ideal: Anglo-American images of landscape. Routledge.

Chandra, Kanchan. 2000. "The transformation of Ethnic Politics in India: The decline of Congress and the Rise of Bahujan Samaj Party in Hoshiarpur." Journal of Asia Studies. 59 (1): 29-61.

Datta, Amrita. 2015. "Determinants of Migration from Rural Bihar," *SARNET Working Paper*. New Delhi: Institute for Human Development.

Datta, Amrita 2016."Migration, Remittances and Changing Sources of Income in Rural Bihar (1999–2011): Some Findings from a Longitudinal Study" *Economic and Political Weekly*. 51(13): 85-93.

Dumont, Louis. 1970. Homo Hierarchicus. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Herring, Ronald J. 2015. The Oxford Handbook Of Food, Politics, And Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Judge, P.S., 2015. Caste hierarchy, dominance, and change in Punjab. *Sociological Bulletin*, *64*(1), pp.55-76.

Krishna, Anirudh. 2003. "What Is Happening to Caste? A View from Some North Indian Villages." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 62 (4): 1171-1993.

Krishnamurthy, Mekhla. 2015 "The Political Economy of Agricultural Markets: Insights from Within and Across Regions". In India Rural Development Report 2013- 2014. New Delhi: Orient BlackswanKeller, Suzanne. 1963. Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society. New York: Random House.

Lindberg, A., 2005. Modernization and effeminization in India: Kerala cashew workers since 1930 (Vol. 95). NIAS Press.

Martin, Nicolas. 2015. "Rural Elites and the Limits of Scheduled Caste Assertiveness in Rural Malwa, Punjab." Economic and Political Weekly 50 (52): 37-44

Mathur, Kuldeep. 2013. Panchayati Raj. New Delhi: Oxford University Press

McCaffrey, Matthew, and Joseph T. Salerno. 2011. "A Theory of Political Entrepreneurship". Modern Economy 02 (04): 552-560

Rodgers, Gerry, Sunil K Mishra, and Alakh N. Sharma 2016 "Four decades of village studies and surveys in Bihar" in Himanshu, Himanshu, Praveen Jha, and Gerry Rodgers. The Changing Village in India: Insights from Longitudinal Research. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Manheim, Karl. 1997. Ideology and Utopia. London: Routledge.

Sbriccoli, Tommaso. 2016 "Land, Labour and Power: A Malwa Village, 1954-2012" Economic and Political Weekly. 51(26-27): 8-16.

Schneider, Mark, and Paul Teske. 1992. "Toward a Theory of the Political Entrepreneur: Evidence from Local Government.". American Political Science Review 86 (03): 737-747.

Sharma, Alakh N. and Gerry Rodgers 2015 ."Agrarian relations and socio-economic change in Bihar." Economic and Political Weekly . 50(52):960-972.

Sharma, Nivedita. 2016. "Does Contract Farming Improve Farmers' Income and Efficiency." *Economic and Political Weekly*. 51(40):63-68.

Sundari, S. 2005. "Migration as a Livelihood Strategy: A Gender Perspective." Economic and Political Weekly. 40(22-23): 2295-2303.

Thakur, Manish. 2014. Indian Village: A Conceptual History. New Delhi: Rawat Publications.

Tilche, A., 2016. Migration, bachelorhood and discontent among the Patidars. *Economic and Political Weekly*, pp.17-24.

Weber, Max, 1958. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons